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Article 7

Book Reviews
La Formation de la pensee de Coleridge (1772-1804) by Paul Deschamps. Paris:
Didier, 1964. Pp. 603. F58.
Professor Deschamps has written a very full and scholarly book on the development of Coleridge's thought up to the year 1804, when he went to Malta.
The book is fuller than any other on its subject up to its date, and even later,
for it is fuller than either ]. A. Appleyard's Coleridge's Pbilosopby of Literature
(1963) or D. P. Calleo's Coleridge and ,be ldea of ,be Modern State (1966),
which are more specialized in subject. As for H. W. Piper's The Active Universe (1962), which has much of interest to sayan Coleridge's thought, Deschamps knew the portion of it published as a paper in 1959. Deschamps relates
in detail the growth of Coleridge's mind in all areas, aesthetic, poetic, philosophical, religious, political and social. He also discusses Coleridge's emotional
and psychological vicissitudes, with penetration and without indulging in wild
theories. The narrative, which covers half of Coleridge's life, extends to more
than 600 pages not because of prolixity but because of the wealth of documentation. The book is so rich in this respect that it has been called a Coleridge
anthology. The author during seven years has thoroughly explored the vast
and increasing literature on Coleridge, the many new texts now being brought
out, the voluminous correspondence, and the new monographs and papers, with
the exhaustiveness expected in a French Dissertation.
His book is even fuller than Hanson's biography of Coleridge's early years
to 1800, for although the latter includes many purely biographical details which
Deschamps rightly omits, Deschamps covers a longer period and devotes more
attention to the contents of Coleridge's \llritings. There is of course a very full
bibliography and index, including copies of the lists of books borrowed at
Bristol and at Gottingen. It is for all these reasons invaluable to Coleridge
studies.
The portrait of Coleridge thus presented is thoroughly sympathetic, although
Coleridge's shortcomings are neither ignored nor explained away, but put in
their place, subordinated to his positive contributions to poetry and to thought.
There was already in French another sympathetic portrait of Coleridge, by
J. Aynard (1907), also very well informed up to its date. But it is now sixty
years old, and Deschamps is up in all the modern discoveries, although he did
not explore MSS. He also shows judgment in avoiding a number of traps
into which other investigators have fallen. He does not try to find anything
profound in Coleridge's earliest attempts at verse, his school compositions, in
which both Plotinism and Tf7 eltsc!J7Jzertz have been detected. Deschamps rightly
considers them "souvent des simples lieux communs, moraux or philosophiques"
(p. 57): "l'angoisse verra plus tard" (p. 47). He correctly shows the limitations of J. L. Lowes' famous book, whose great virtues have tended to conceal
its shortcomings (pp. 71, 84, 421, 441, etc.). He hints doubts that Coleridge
trans1ated Synesius before he was fifteen (p. 61); confirmation of the doubts
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will be found in Coleridge's letter of 26 March 1794 to his brother George, in
which he says: "Synesius.... I mean to translate" (eL, I, 76-77). There are
many such instances of judgment and perception, such as the observation of
confusion in the ideas of the conversation poems (e. g., p. 412 and 431).
But Deschamps still accepts uncritically Lamb's account of Coleridge as a
Bluecoat boy reciting Plotious and Jamblichus in the origioal (p. 61 and cf. 379).
First of all, Lamb speaks of Coleridge reciting II Homer in his Greek, or Pindar,"
and does not say that he recited Plotinus or Jamblichus in Greek; this makes
the feat more believable. Secondly, the statement, as far as it goes, is not the
independent testimony of Lamb, but goes back to Coleridge himself (Unpuhlished Letters, II, 274, as noted already by Miss Werkmeyster), and is not
wonh more than Coleridge's other recollections of his juvenile prowess. Hence
there is no secure foundation for the accounts of Coleridge's familiarity as a
schoolboy with the more important Neoplatonist philosophers. And when we
come to consider more carefully what is meant by "thought" or pensee, certain other limitations begin to appear.
One may extend the meaning of ., thought" to include not only intellectual
activity of all kinds, but also every passing notion, every fleeting fancy or odd
association of ideas, every dream and every psychological reaction to external
or internal events. In this broad sense, Deschamps' title is justified: he endeavors
to cover all this, as far as the evidence allows, with many interesting connections
and illuminating references.
But if we limit "thought" so that it means only purely intellectual, and
specifically philosophical, activity, then this book covers sometimes too much,
sometimes too little. There is a tendency among literary students of Coleridge
with little or no lmowledge of philosophy to consider U philosophical" any
expression of belief, however vague, in matters of religion or of ethics. In the
Coleridgian context these students often speak vaguely of general trends such
as "Platonism," "Neoplatonism," and "Christian Platonism," without specifying
the precise philosophy to which they refer. Also, they tend to speak of these
three trends as if they were all one and the same thing, which is worse. That
one thing is made to consist in a vague and general belief in God and/or in
immortality, with hints of mystical meanings and sentimental overtones. This
is what Deschamps calls elegantly" la vision platonicienne" (Part III, Chapter ii).
He is usually more definite than most of these students, but even he is not definite
enough.
It is easy to see what is likely to happen when Kant, whom Coleridge studied
seriously for many years and profoundly admired, is brought into this frame of
reference. The philosophical innocents ask: "didn't Kant believe in God? and
didn't he also believe in immortality? So he's also a Platonist, and there is no
philosophical difference between l;im and any other member of the groupbetween Plato and Plotinus, Berkeley and Kant, or Cudworth and Kant: they
all believed in the same things." Thus the most disparate philosophies, with the
most opposite basic assumptions, are boiled down to an amorphous mass, and
that is claimed to be Coleridge's "thought" (see for instance Deschamps, pp.
S1 and 471).
But it so happens that Coleridge believed in philosophy: not in philosophy
as vague belief or lackadaisical daydreaming, but in philosophy as a science.
He ventured at times into occultism and mysticism; indeed he tried everything;
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but at bottom he was deeply dedicated to the philosophic quest, to the search
for truth by rational means, to "philosophy as a science," to which he devoted
in particular one chapter of the Biographia, the Ninth. That chapter is the
culmination of a philosophical argument running continuously through the
four preceding chapters, and proceeding less continuously through the next four.
This strictly philosophical argument, bm.ed upon German philosophy, and sometimes literally translated from it, is too often neglected by the students of
Coleridge whom I have called "purely literary," or, to use Croce's famous
phrase for Saintsbury, "digiuni di filosofia." In one edition of the Biographia,
excellent in its literary commentary (George Sampson's, 1920), these philosophical
chapters are altogether omitted. And from a purely literary point of view it
is perhaps understandable; but Coleridge was not a purely literary man. After
reading his unpublished Logic and other writings, one may even put up a claim
for him as a philosopher, though not as great a philosopher as a poet and
literary critic. Anyone who really v.rants to understand the mind of Coleridge
must consider philosophy as a science. This means that the history of philosophy must be studied with the proper regard it requires both as a philosophical
and an historical discipline; and in this Deschamps sometimes comes short.
For instance, take Cudworth, the philosopher who is supposed by the purely
literary students of Coleridge to have supplied him in advance with the Kandan philosophy, a claim which alone shows an incredible lack of historical
perspective, and of which there is some trace in Deschamps (p. 461). But
Deschamps' acquaintance with Cudworth appears to be not only deficient but
second-hand, for he repeats the error of Piper in speaking of Cudworth's "plastick natures" in the plural, thus equating them to monads (p. 412, n. 25),
whereas for Cudworth" plastick Nature" is emphatically one, a kind of divine
Providence that looks after the natural \vorld, as Deschamps states more correctly on p. 402.
Again, Coleridge was well acquainted with the difference between "transcendent" and "transcendental" in the Kantian system, and explained it repeatedly: see BL, J, 64 and the MS. Logic, II, 208. Deschamps sometimes misses the
difference, as the following passages will show. Speaking of "la theorie platonicienne de la reminiscence," (p. 382), he says:
"lei c'est l'existence transcendentale des idees qui est cnvisagee dans un jour
essentiellement poetique" (p. 383; italics mine).
The term "transcendental" was coined by Kam to mark the difference
between his own philosophy and all previons systems of metaphysics, which he
considered "dogmatic." It cannot therefore be applied to Plato's ideas, which
if anything are "transcendent."
But Deschamps uses the latter term when he means" transcendental": speaking of the idealism to which Coleridge turned after his disillusionment with the
philosophy of the Revolution and its empiricism, Deschamps says:
"n existe dans l'esprit de l'homme nn certain nombre d'idees, les realites
mathematiques en sont un bon example, qui ont une existence trm]scendeme,
c'est-a-dire qu'ellcs ne sauraient, dans leur universalite et leur perfection, etre
derivees de l'experience" (p. 381; italics mine).
"Transcendent" means something utterly beyond the range of human
experience, and not a cognition a priori such as the mathematical idea of a
circle. Those who think that the distinction benvecn "transcendent" and
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" transcendental" is trifling or a quibble, should stay away from Kant-and
from Coleridge. These men took that distinction seriously.
Having grasped Kant's Critique, Coleridge was well aware also that previous
metaphysical systems a priori were to be rejected as "dogmatic," and he
repeatedly criticised the Cambridge Platonists (the group to which Cudworth
belonged) for their lack of the critical approach, i. e, their failure to institute the
preliminary inquisition into the validity (not the psychological operation) of
the human cognitive faculties, which constitutes the Critique of Pure Reason: see
Literary Remains, III, 157-58 and 415-16.
Deschamps instead can write: "Berkeley, Spinosa, Ies Platoniciens de Cambridge, les mystiques apporteront leur pierre a l\~difice que viendra couronner
Ie transcendentalisme kantien" (p. 478).
But in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant had cut the ground from under
all previous a priori metaphysical speculations, so that he cannot be used to
"crown an edifice" built out of the theories of the Cambridge Platonists who,
as Coleridge stressed, were ignorant of the critical philosophy, and necessarily
so. The facts are rather the other way around. ,Nhile all Coleridge'S early
studies contributed to his intellectual growth, and in that sense "prepared him"
for Kant, what he finally attempted in his mature speculations was to ground
the traditional beliefs of Christianity on the philosophical foundation provided
by transcendentalism. Such a plan may not be feasible philosophically, but
Coleridge was neither the first nor the last to attempt it. Deschamps has a
glimpse of this when he says at his conclusion that Coleridge restored faith
in the spirit "en s'appuyant soli dement sur l'idealisme allemand" (p.541).
Regarding Coleridge'S early study of Kant, it looks at times as if Deschamps
ignored or minimized the evidence now available of Coleridge'S earliest acquaintance with Kant. He apparently ignores Coleridge's statement, soon after landing
in Germany, and in contradiction to a distinguished German poet, Klopsrock,
that "all are Kantians whom I have met with" (eL, I, 444). He omits to quote
Prof. vVilkinson's excellent analysis of the notebook entry of 1799 already noted
by Chinol, which he quotes on pp. 456, n. 7, and 509, n. 107. Prof. Wilkinson
concludes" that his (Coleridge's) philosophical powers were already so highly
developed that he could make, en passant but with complete sureness, the kind
of inference only possible to someone familiar with the fundamental issues
involved" (NB, I, Notes, p. 452). On the other hand, Deschamps is sound in
accepting 1801 as the date of Coleridge'S study of the Transcendental Aesthetic,
rejecting Lovejoy's alternative hypothesis, even though that also is at bottom
a Kantian idea (p. 470), and in limiting the extent or the depth of this first
serious study of the Critique on the reasonable grounds that if Coleridge had
then gone deeper into Kant, there would be traces of it in his notebooks, as
there are in 1803 (p. 458, n. 19). In the latter year Coleridge takes up Kant
in considerable detail, although characteristically shifting to a different work,
and Deschamps gives a good account of it (pp. 469-78), as Coburn gave an
excellent typographical rendition.
The purely literary students of Coleridge seem to make sometimes the assumption that to admit any derivation from German thought is derogatory, implying
a lack of originality, if not actually the nasty charge of plagiarism that was
hurled at Coleridge in the ] 9th century. But there is an alternative which they
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do not consider: that Coleridge's borrowings and derivations from German
thought were not. a bl~mish but a virtue, a positive contribution to English
thought, and that tn taking over Kant and Schelling lay Coleridge's originality.
Even now E~glish. th?ught has something to learn from Coleridge: to study Kant.
In conclUSIon, It IS to be hoped that Professor Deschamps will in time
complete his study with another volume, carrying the account to 1834, but with
a more exact account of philosophy. both ancient and modern.

University of Wisconsin.

G. N. G.

ORSINI ••

Coleridge and the Idea of the Modern State by David P. Calleo. Yale Studies
in Political Science, 18. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1966. Pp. viii 157. $5.00.

+

The further we recede from Coleridge's age the easier it is to see his political
thought in perspective. Yet there is a danger that what we gain in objectivity we
lose in personal engagement. One of the great virtues of Mr. Calleo's excellent
study is that it combines exemplary scholarship and serious commitment to
vital political issues. On every page he demonstrates the truth of his contention that it is Coleridge's "extraordinary suggestiveness n that makes him "in
politics, as in many other fields, so rewarding a subject for close and imaginative
study." As the introduction makes clear, he is not concerned with Coleridge's
political influence on nineteenth-century thought, pervasive as that was, but with
his idea of the state and the relevance of this to modern constitutional problems.
In discussing his timeless relevance, he does not make the common error of
claiming too much for Coleridge. For example, he says quite frankly and
unequivocally that Coleridge'S essay on International Law in The Friend is haphazard and ignores the problem of the good man in the bad state. He recognizes
too that Coleridge'S plans for a National Church were somewhat unrealistic, since
the Church of England however broad could never become the "general guild
of the intellectuals in the contemporary world" that Coleridge thought it should.
While it is absolutely true that the distinction Coleridge drew between the
National Church and the Church of England is not wholly satisfactory, he did
devote more thought to the problem than is apparent from Mr. Calleo's discussion. For example, his marginal comments on Bishop Blomfield's Cbarge to
the Clergy of his Diocese, 1830 reveal how deeply concerned with the practical
implications of this distinction he was, while his extensive notes on Richard
Baxter's writings usefully supplement the argument in his last work, On tbe
Constitution of the ChU1'cb and State, carefully underlining the point that "two
distinct trusts and functions may be vested in and exercised by the same person."
But, on the whole, Mr. Calleo has made excellent use of Coleridge's unpublished
writings to clarify his published views. Thus on pages 77-8 two skilfully selected
passages substantiate the claim that Coleridge'S psychological definition of the
state is expressed more clearly in the Notebooks than in Cburch and State.
Underlying the whole study is a serious preoccupation with twO related
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problems: consensus and constitutionalism. Like John Stuart Mill, whose misunderstanding of Coleridge's terms "permanence" and "progression)l is ably
corrected, Mr. CalleD admires Coleridge's unique awareness of the complex factors
that unite people in a National State. The essays in Tbe Friend on Hobbes and
Rousseau are indeed unfair to those great writers, but they have a timeless
relevance, since they demonstrate clearly that neither a theory of coercion nor
the idea of "man in a rational world of tidy universals" offers a satisfactory
explanation of political cohesion. By recognizing the mixed and often irrational
nature of man, Coleridge is able to offer instead a psychology of man and society
that is neither doctrinaire nor reactionary but does justice to the permanent
realities of social behaviour.
Mr. Calleo succeeds very well in illustrating that Coleridge's idea of the state
embodies psychological, historical, and philosophical elements. The first two gave
it a sound empirical basis, while the latter, concerned with the Constitution as a
particular national reflection of an ideal Constitution, is more metaphysical and
therefore more open to challenge. Basil Willey and many others have elucidated
the complex argument of Church and State, but no one has established so clearly
its modern relevance. As Mr. Calleo rightly says, Church and State is "more
than a sentimental, if imaginative, defense of a passing order."
In addition to disentangling what is of permanent interest from what is
merely ephemeral in Coleridge'S political writings, Mr. Calleo draws attention
to the supreme importance of the exercise of the "political imagination" for
any society. Scattered references to Coleridge's recognition of its vital function
are so illuminating that one wishes that the theme had been more fully developed.
But perhaps Mr. CalIco will take this up in a more general study of the role of
the political imagination in modern society.
In chapter seven there is an interesting explanation of Coleridge'S unwillingness
to grant political power on the basis of intellectual distinction. It has always
seemed a somewhat perverse and reactionary view, difficult either to defend or
explain. But Mr. Calleo succeeds in making this view intelligible. The course
taken by the French Revolution seemed to Coleridge to establish beyond doubt
the subversive nature of the rootless intellectual-Reason divorced from Understanding. Rights asserted at the expense of corresponding Duties. The situation
in Africa today offers a modern parallel. Although there was nothing comparable in England to the strong anti-clerical tradition in France (English radicalism and dissent only rarely assuming extreme revolutionary forms), Coleridge
feared that to grant political power solely on the grounds of education or intellect
might endanger both church and state. If property were free to circulate the
intellectual should not remain permanently disenfranchised. Coleridge saw society
as an ever-changing dynamic organism.
What arc the responsibilities of the clerisy? The problem is still with us, even
if we do not normally use this term to describe our educators and guardians of
culture. In seeking to reveal the contemporary relevance of Coleridge's ideas,
Mr. Calleo's preoccupation with the role of the academic in American society
leads him to a rather unscholarly use of Coleridge'S ideas about the importance
of first principles and the powers of the "recluse genius." He seems almost to
suggest that withdrawal from direct action is the price the university teacher
should be willing to pay for his privileged position in society. Whatever Coleri~ge
may have said about those at the fountain heads of civilisation being in possessIOn
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of seminal ideas and refraining from premature action, he neither advocated
withdra~al nor withdrew ~mself. He wrote pamphlets, gave political lectures,
and lobbIed members of parliament. However, this is the only occasion on which
~he attempt to establish modern parallels leads to a slight perversion of Coleridge'S
Idea. ,Mr. Calle?~s book is a notable addition to the rapidly growing literature on
Colendge's politlcs. As it appears in the Yale Studies in Political Science, it
should succeed in convincing political philosophers that Coleridge's idea of the
state has something more than mere historical interest.
JOHN COLMER

University of Adelaide

imaginative Reason: The Poetry of Matthe ro.1J Arnold by A. Dwight Culler. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. 303. $7.50.
Matthew Arnold lives! "No Arnold could ever write a novel," Professor
Culler is fond of quoting the poet, but he has virtually made him the hero of
one, treating his quirks and qualities as authoritatively as those of a fictional
character. Imaginative Reason: TlJe Poetry of NlcrttlJew Arnold casts Arnold in
the unexpected role of piccaro, and if Professor Culler makes him a refreshingly
loveable scamp he is also willing to administer some pretty sharp corrective raps,
when needed. We smile at the thirteen-year-old's earnestness, chuckle when
Marguerite gives the young lover a taste of his own medicine (Arnold, sphinxlike even to his closest friends, complained she was not frank with him), and
frown at his uncharitable poetic treatment of Harriet Martineau. Even when
Professor Culler strongly scores Arnold for having abandoned the noble concept
Joy for the distinctly lower social value Charm, he does it with love and the
leaven of good humor. His tone, indeed, is fairly uproarious at times.
The sheer readable fun rests on a solid intellectual base. Professor Culler has
previously identified Matthew Arnold's" symbolic landscape, a group of related
figures, and the myth or history of their lives," in the introduction to his Poetry
and Criticism of Alattbew Arnold (1961). In Imaginative Reason he fills in his
outline so that it becomes an extremely persuasive model of how to read-and to
teach-Arnold's poetry. Briefly, he traces the growth of the poet's mind, in
tenns of the poetry as it moves from Romantic isolation in "the Forest Glade"
through social disillusionment on "the Burning (or Darlding) Plain" to reconciliation with the self and with the world in "the Wide-Glimmering Sea." Professor Culler discusses the various roles possible in each of these symbolic settings,
and their linkage by the journey down the River of Life. It is all very plausible
and useful, an imaginative recreation of a poetic universe.
There must, of course, be objections. The reviewer's reach must exceed the
critic's grasp, or what's a notice for? Imaginative Reason, then, seems a bit pat
in its discussion of the third division of the Arnoldian myth. To identify "the
Wide-Glimmering Sea" as an image or place of reconciliation is to imply a
coming together of various people and points of view, or one man's reintegration
of scattered faculties and fragmentary perceptions. This is perfecdy adequate
in a discussion of Arnold's personal development. But in his poetry the sea is
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more often a place of dissolution. As Professor Culler himself declares, Arnold's
"image of the Sea of Life . . . is precisely comparable to the darkling plain."
Bitter and divisive, few of Arnold's seas are of the wide-glimmering variety.
Usually they are wet hells, salt and estranging. His more familiar image for
cosmic process, "the life-circulation of nature," is as Professor Culler points out
"the movement of the stars, the endless Rowing of great rivers, and all that is
denoted by the phrase 'the general life.''' It is, for example, the River Oxus,
not the waiting sea, which provides the cyclic movement and hope of joy in
Sobrab and RUStU1Jl. The sea may be used as a !ymbol of universal reconciliation but, in company with virtually all Nineteenth Century poets except Tennyson, Arnold himself docs not habitually or even oftcn use it tIus way.
However, this is a minor difficulty. Much more important are the things Professor Culler succeeds in doing so easily and so well, such as when he pinpoints
the distinctive quality of Arnold's elegy, "an instrument of change rather than
of permanence." He quietly demonstrates the relevance of history and biography
to poetic criticism, with more effect than a polemical assertion. He almost
incidentally yet with great authority distinguishes Romantic and Victorian poetry,
the more convincingly for his tact. For he never closes the door on those who
would hold that Blake, after all, controls the three-fold myth underlying Arnold's
poetry. "Forest Glade" and "Burning Plain" correspond to Innocence and
Experience, "the Wide-Glimmering Sea" and its more satisfactory equivalent
"Imaginative Reason" resemble closely thc third term in the Blakean dialectic,
the Marriage of Heaven and Hell. In Professor Culler's more Arnoldian statement
of the idea, religion and science are united and transcended by poetry, or the
lives of "the Children of the Second Birth." The Blakean concept of vision
seems to underlie Arnold's vie\v that poetry embodies abstract moral truth; the
Scholar Gypsy lives in the poet's dream of the Forest Glade, disappears in the
awakening on the Burning Plain, yet at the last proves an unquenchable reality
"without the pact's beginning to dream again." Blake's Vision would seem very
close to Professor Culler's definitions of Imaginative Reason: the faculty which
recreates the living idea behind a myth; a joy without illusion "acceptable to
the adult as well as to the youth "j Arnold's" own personal myth embodied in
human history."
ALLAN DANZIG
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The TVorld of Marcel Proust by Germaine Bree. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1966. Pp. 295. $3.50. Cloth, $1.95. Paper.
1

Germaine Bn!c is no newcomer to Proust studies. Years of familiarity have
further deepened and widened her command of the subject. She moves with ease
and complete mastery through the Proustian creation. What is more, she can be
trusted. She is not out to propose revolutionary interpretations. Her modest and
valuable book profits fully from work done by others, as well as from her own
former research. At a rime when literary criticism tends to be dogmatic, and
critics feel that it is both honorable and intelligent to be intolerant of each other,
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Germaine Bree clearly represents the view that exegesis, though bound to be
p~~onal, should fit into a collective effort to understand and appreciate a writer's
VISIon.

The. qu:uiti~ of her book are obvious. It goes directly to essentials, and its
style lS VIvaCIOUS. The general reader, especially the student penetrating into
Proust's novel for the first time, will be grateful for a balanced, comprehensive
approach. Those more familiar with A In Recbercbe du temps perdu will appreciate the de-emphasis of the traditional view of Proust as a dandy and a snob, the
stress laid on the earlier writings (especially Jean Santeuil, with its interesting
use of a narrator), the unwillingness to read Proust's work as a biographical
novel or a r011lan it clef-and above all, the quite meritorious attempt of the
critic (and here Miss Bree is faithful to Proust's own prescription) to use the
work of the writer as the only reliable dictionary with which to assess and control
his meanings.
The organization of the study allows for a substantial section dealing both
with Proust's life and with the social and cultural climate of the period; another
section surveying his early writings (Les Plaisirs et les lours, Jean Santeuil); but
the bulk of the book is given over to a study of the great novel from a variety
of points of view, and takes into account problems of technique, thematic
developments, recurrent patterns, and the webs of metaphors which contribute
to the opulent texture and structure of the work.
Such a general presentation, no matter how bright and sophisticated, obviously
excludes the possibility of exploring any single area ill depth. Yet Gennaine
Brce succeeds, at almost every point, in making incisive comments which could
lead to further developments, and which ought to be of great value to the
student. This informative and stimulating function is, after all, the chief aim in
writing a general study such as this. The author's comments range over a wide
area: Proust's ability to remold in retrospect, his awareness of. the" spectacular"
quality of social life, his notion of art as a mental construct, his central theme
of identity in metamorphosis, the ironic destruction of private myths and the
even more ironic fact that this very destruction is illusory, the principle of
discontinuity as fundamental to the Proustian character creation, the satire of
society's parasitic exploitation of art and artists, the novel's meaning not in tenns
of a past recaptured but of a determinism transcended.
The very qualities of this book imply some limitations. There is no central
thesis (is this a defect?), and the most ferrile ideas are never thoroughly exploited. Beyond that, it is certain that every reader will be able, if he chooses to
be lukewarm to the positive aspects of this study, to list his own favorite notions
which are here, perchance, neglected. I myself would have welcomed some
more patient analyses. The extraordinary opening pages (the images of the bed,
of the traveler, of metempsychosis) deserve, it seems to me, closer scrutiny. The
Swann episode is rightfully presented as an immense paradigm of other loves in
the novel. But is it not proleptically rooted in the very anguish of Marcel as he
waits, in bed, for Franc;oise's intercession with his mother precisely dur~ng a
visit of Swann whom he (erroneously!) imagines incapable of understanding a
suffering such as his? And does Gennaine BICe not fail to underscore one of
the most fundamental Proustian themes: the fecundity of unhappiness?
But these are matters of emphasis. They in no way mar a study distinguished
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for its sensitivity, its profound knowledge of Proust, and its ability to communicate insights with lucid enthusiasm.
VICTOR BROMBERT

Yale University

Yeats At W m'k by Curtis B. Bradford. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1965. Pp. xvii + 407. $12.50.
The power and mystery of artistic creation is by no means an obsession
peculiar to the twentieth century. It has been a topic of perennial fascination
and speculation since ancient times. What manner of man is the artist? Whence
comes his" inspiration "-the word itself denoting the presence of a god, or Muse,
breathing a divine vision into a mortal mind? What eternal principles of truth
and beauty can be discerned in or deduced from the work of art?
But if such questions are not new, the modern search for their answers is
often a departure frDm traditional methods of criticism. For it is only recently
that authors have left, in their successive manllscript drafts, a record of the
changes which slowly brollght about the finished work. And it is in this
fossil record of evolution, rather than in the author himself or in the final
product, that some modern scholars and critics seek to read the riddle of creation.
Let it be said at once that this search, though it turns up many discoveries
of interest and sheds light on some subsidiary matters, fails to penetrate to the
sanctuary of Apollo. Deeper than critical or scientific plummet has yet sounded
lie the springs of artistic life. It is in vain that the most painstaking scholar
tracks the great lyric through change after change, seeking the key that will
unlock its inmost secrets. The poem itself, when once in Yeats's words it has
come right "with a click like the closing of a box," is no less than ever a
miracle, the final proof of godlike power. It is to this fact-the final resistance
of the creative process to textual analysis-that Professor Bradford's book most
eloquently testifies.
That said, the interest of such a study to specialists can be acknowledged. It
does tell us a good deal about Yeats's methods of composition, and it clarifies
some ambiguous passages and authorizes certain readings rather than others. It
shows how the poet worked toward maximum energy coupled with maximum
simplicity of diction and phrasing, so that the finished version of a poem is both
more dynamic and more colloquial than the earlier drafts. It shows the steady
progress toward increasing correctness of type: toward maldng a ballad, say,
conform more fully to the poet's abstract ideal of what a ballad should be. And
it reveals Yeats's constant effort to find the fresh word, to make the scene or
action of poem or play increasingly vivid sensuously.
The two most important points which emerge from Professor Bradford's study
are the major rOle played by form in the shaping of the final poem, and the
struggle Yeats had to develop and control his "personae." These two points
alone would justify such a study, for the first shows us something, however
dimly, about the creative process itself, and the second throws light on the
difference in quality and in kind between Yeats's earlier and later, less and more
successful poems.
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Young students of poetry, as all teachers of it know, have always to be coaxed
out of th~ir conviction that the content, the wbat, of any passage is the impo:-tant thmg. They have to be shown that, in John Ciardi's phrase, in poetry
It IS not the wbat but the bow that counts. Anden tells us that a young man
wh.o says he wants to be a poet because he has something to say will never
wrlt.e good verse. "But if," this practised poet continues, "he says he likes
foobng around with words, listening to what they do," why then there may
be hope for him. Yeats's manuscripts show hmv nue this is. Poems are made
of words, and ,vords have sound, shape, rhythm, and infinite variety of effect
in different combinations. They appeal primarily to the senses, only secondarily
to the mind. The first thing Yeats did was to set his form; once he had set it,
he rarely changed. He tries Hnes with three or four stresses before deciding on
three; he finds the stanza form he wants; he sets his rhyme scheme very early,
and clings to it while the entire context changes around it. Form, to a large
extent, controls meaning.
Much of Yeats's revision of his later poetry, Bradford finds, is concerned
with developing and controlling the expressiveness of his personae. One source
of the limitation of Yeats's early poetry, up through Tbe TVind Among the Reeds,
is the vagueness and abstractness of their personae. The voice speaking in them
is not sharply enough defined. Gradually Yeats came to believe that poetry, above
all, is memorable speech, and that speech comes from a man. A poem, then,
must be a personal utterance; but it is a personal utterance controlled, refined,
objectified out of "the bundle of accident and incoherence that sits down to
breakfast." In "The First Principle" Yeats says, "A poet writes always of his
personal life . . . he never speaks directly as to someone at the breakfast table,
there is always a phantasmagoria " .. he has been rebonl as an idea, something
intended, complete." Yeats's principal problem in revision, his manuscripts reveal,
was to refine "the accidence of a particular man involved in an actual situation
in the alembic of his imagination," as Bradford puts it. "'Then the trouble was
serious, Yeats would write draft after draft until he had transmuted accidence
into permanence. To the effort to attain this public mode of speech, developed
and controlled out of private experience, the successive changes in his manuscript drafts testify, as the final result testifies triumphantly to his success.
Students of Yeats will be grateful for Professor Bradford's patient and
thorough scholarship, though they may reject the more extravagant claims his
publishers make for the results of his study.
GERTRUDE M. WHITE
Oakland University

Nortbrop Frye in A10dern O'iticisJJ1: Selected Papers f1"011Z tlJe Englisb Institute,
ed. Murray Krieger. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. x +
203. $5.00.

"The devil's advocate," W. K. Wimsatt
prospect of canonization is imminent." It's
that we needn't worry about canonization in
of an introductory essay by the editor, a letter

says, "is not called in until the
clear from this volume, however,
the candidate's lifetime. It consists
from Frye addressed to the original
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meeting, the Conference papers by Angns Fletcher, W. K. Wimsatt and Geoffrey
Hartman respectively defending, attacking and weighing Frye's work, a brief
comment on the three papers by the subject himself, and an excellent checklist
(by John E. Grant) of writings by and about Frye. These lively, witty and
rather disjointed proceedings resemble as printed not so much a premature canonization as a premature trial for heresy.
Murray Krieger delivers the general indictment in his introduction. The
original papers, he says, do not relate Frye sufficiendy to "the modem critical
tradition" as defined by Krieger and his new apologists for poetry. Frye's work
and theirs is "little less than mutually exclusive." Frye is an irresponsible Ariel
whose flights must be checked by the spirit of gravity. Krieger revives Hulme's
mischievous and naive distinction between romanticism and classicism to contrast
Frye's U lunar dialectic" and II romantic escapism" with the tragic vision, classical
and existential, which accepts man's radical flaw. For less impressionistic anathemas, however, we have to turn to Wimsatt and Hartman.
Hartman argues that II Frye's criticism and an historical approach differ more
than we are led to believe." First, as an attempt to find ideas of order in secular
history, Frye's mythical method is insufficiently heuristic. His II consciously
spatial . . . concept of literary structure" seems to evade II the fact that
literature unfolds in time rather than quasi-simultaneously in space." Second,
"Frye's system reposes on a tacit assumption of the authenticity of myth." His
interpretation of literature by " displacement" is analogous to the use of II accomodation" in Biblical hermeneutics. But, since we don't share an official theology,
Frye can't show us an unaccomodated state of myth. Third, Frye's II concept of
a verbal universe" abstracts language from its concrete historical settings. Frye
forgets that a verbal fiction mediates reality only in II the course of a
particular."
Angus Fletcher attends to Hartman's first two objections. (Fletcher, Frye,
Krieger and Wimsatt all slight the third, although it is crucial to the relationship
between Frye and the orthodox New Critics). In the first half of his essay
Fletcher analyzes Anatomy as historical criticism. In the second half, he makes
a brilliant case for the work as a post-Hegelian history of the imagination. It
is an II anatomy," by Frye's own definition a form of fiction which presents
us with a view of the world in terms of a single intellectual pattern." Anatomies
are often utopias, ideal visions of the goals of society. Fletcher calls Frye's work
"utopian history" because it is built on the modern liberal vision of the cultivated imagination as the "great instrument of moral good." Frye's phenomenology of the spirit presents two contrary movements within Western history.
His evolution of the "idea of the hero" reveals the poets' "increasingly liberal
perception that man as a social or political being has become gradually less free."
This "epic struggle for imaginative freedom" culminates in private, not public,
apocalypse. Frye's metahistory doesn't depend, as the millenarian historicist's
does, on cycles which have in fact II a priori temporal duration." It restores to
criticism what Eliade calls the II sacred time" of myth.
W. K. Wimsatt makes the commonsense attack on Frye's II Gnostic mythopoeia," which he calls in one particularly Johnsonian outburst" an extreme and
violent conjunction of schematism and concreteness." Frye, he says, "wants all
the idealism, autonomy and absoluteness of a subjective humanization but at
the same time a highly concrete typology." Frye, like Blake, "would number the
(I
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streaks of the mythic tulip." \Vimsatt wittily describes Frye as a visionary critic
in the sense in which Frye finds Chatterton and Macpherson visionary poets.
Frye writes "criticism as myth." Like his predecessors, he finds it necessary
to authenticate his vision by creating pseudepigrapha. \iVimsatt is not as tolerant,
however, of criticiS11l by "the oracular process of composition." Frye gets away
with" violations of logic and order n because his style itself is "discontinuous ...
aphoristic . . . oracular." His diction evokes" a lurid glow, a feeling of rituals
enacted in the deepest recesses of the racial past." But, "for the rest of us,"
Wimsatt asks, "what if the cast of critical characters should all turn out to be
phantoms? "
This question displays the trial for heresy. It is a demand to know if Frye's
religion is true. Wimsatt and Krieger refuse to acknowledge the hypothetical
nature of Frye's mythopoeia. At bottom, perhaps, they don't agree with him
that man is the symbol-making animal, that all his knowledge is constructed
"as if." The tension Wimsatt finds benveen belief in the mythic tulip and
desire to number its streaks, or that Hartman finds between Frye's" evangelical"
and "scientific" tendencies, expresses the plight of all modern systematizers.
Readers of Frye won't find much new in his notes on his critics, but they will
find him, as usual, eloquently inviting his critics to clarify the alternate myths
into which they incorporate his specific insights while rejecting his system.
Frye proposes, in Hartman's phrase, "to demysticize and democratize" criticism
by offering a conceptual model open to experiment. Both Fletcher and Hartman
recognize our desperate need for a paradigm which would organize our" museum
without walls." To Frye's" e pUT si 1Jluove" Krieger responds, "Heresy!"
and Wimsatt, "Witchcraft!" Hartman is our "scientist." Even though he
objects, for example, that Frye's "displacement" has no demonstrable origin,
he says the concept" is empirically sound; it ,vorb; it is teachable." And by
trying it out Hartman has found Frye's most important specific contribution to
literary theory, <l the permanence of Romance." Fortunately, the fate of Frye's
system is probably in the hands of empiricists like Hartman.
ANDREW VON HENDY

Boston College

